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THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PETITION CLAUSE AS AN
ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR CHALLENGING VOTER
INITIATIVES THAT BURDEN THE ENACTMENT OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION FOR GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
BISEXUALS
KEVIN FRANCIS O'NEILL'
In the battle for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights, most of the fighting has
centered on two sources of constitutional protection: substantive due process and
equal protection. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to find in either of those
constitutional guarantees a broad source of protection for gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals.2  The purpose of my remarks today is to suggest that the First
Amendment-specifically, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment 3-provides
an alternative basis for vindicating gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights in certain cases.
At least in the context of voter initiatives that seek to abolish anti-discrimination
protection for sexual orientation, the Petition Clause is a promising alternative to
equal protection and substantive due process.
The principal reason for invoking the Petition Clause is that the Supreme Court is
much more receptive these days to First Amendment claims than it is to equal
protection and substantive due process claims. As for equal protection, the Court
does not regard sexual orientation as a suspect classification-so it analyzes claims
by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals under its least protective standard: "rational basis"
review.' Substantive due process is even less promising. We have only to remember
the disaster of Bowers v. Hardwick,5 where the Court contemptuously rejected any
privacy right in consensual same-gender sex.6 More recently, in the right-to-die
'Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University.
2See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (substantive due process)
(emphatically rejecting the notion that the fundamental right to privacy identified in the
Court's substantive due process precedents extends to same-gender sex); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (equal protection) (subjecting equal protection claims by gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals to the Court's most deferential standard: "rational basis" review).
3The Petition Clause is contained in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides, in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1(1791).
4Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
'478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6Id. at 190-91.
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cases,7 the Court displayed an open reluctance to recognize any new categories of
fundamental rights.8 In First Amendment cases, by contrast, the Court is much more
receptive to innovative arguments and political minorities.9
When it comes to anti-gay voter initiatives, the need for an alternative to equal
protection and substantive due process is especially compelling. This is made plain
by the conflicting outcomes of two recent cases-Romer v. Evans"0 and Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati'-which both involved
voter initiatives that abolished anti-discrimination protection for gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals. Except for their scope (Romer involved a state-wide referendum, while
Cincinnati featured a local election), the initiatives in these two cases were virtually
identical. And yet they produced opposite results. Applying "rational basis"
review,' 2 the Supreme Court struck down the Romer initiative.' 3  Employing the
same deferential standard, 4 and straining to distinguish the Romer facts, 5 the Sixth
Circuit upheld the Cincinnati initiative.' 6 But the Sixth Circuit did not so much
distinguish Romer as read into the Cincinnati initiative a benign effect (one that the
7In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997), the Supreme Court rejected, respectively, a substantive due process and an equal
protection challenge to state statutes criminalizing assisted suicide.
8Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (emphatically confining substantive due process to "those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition') (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
9See, e.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
(stressing the First Amendment value of uninhibited communication with voters, the Court
strikes down Colorado's restrictions on the procedure for getting initiatives on the ballot)
(among the restrictions invalidated were requirements that people circulating petitions be
registered Colorado voters and wear badges identifying themselves by name); City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invoking the First Amendment vagueness doctrine to strike
down an anti-loitering ordinance aimed at preventing gang members from controlling
neighborhood streets); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the
Communications Decency Act, a federal statute that criminalized the on-line display of
"indecent" materials to minors) (holding that the Internet, unlike broadcast media, enjoys the
same unqualified protection afforded the print media); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (striking down an injunction that imposed a "floating
buffer zone," requiring pro-life protesters to stay 15 feet from those entering or leaving an
abortion clinic); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking down
a ban on anonymous leafletting); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down
local ordinance whose enforcement barred a homeowner from displaying on her property a
sign that opposed U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf).
'0517 U.S. 620 (1996).
"128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
12517 U.S. at 631.
'
3Id. at 635-36.
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Supreme Court dissenters had no trouble finding in Romer 17 as well): namely,
Cincinnatians were merely "elirninat[ing] 'special class status' and 'preferential
treatment' for gays as gays."'
18
What is to stop other municipalities from following Cincinnati's lead? What is to
stop other homophobes from rallying around Cincinnati's "special rights"
accusation? What is to stop other judges, hostile to Romer's result, from echoing
Cincinnati's analysis? Since, after all, Romer requires the application of "rational
basis" reviewl 9-a standard that invites a rubber-stamped approval of the challenged
action-what is to prevent Romer's result from becoming the exception rather than
the rule? There is only one answer to these questions: Resort to a constitutional
provision other than the Equal Protection Clause. Enter the Petition Clause.
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.2"
By its terms, the Petition Clause is implicated by voter initiatives that strip a political
minority of anti-discrimination protection and place special obstacles in the path of
that minority should it ever seek to restore the protection it has lost.
This was exactly the effect of the Cincinnati initiative-and, as part of the
litigation team at the district court level in that case, I drafted a Petition Clause
argument that found its way into our brief. In granting us an injunction that blocked
the initiative from taking effect, the district judge embraced my argument, holding
that the First Amendment afforded a distinct basis for striking the initiative down.2
On appeal, the plaintiffs relied exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the
Petition Clause argument proved successful the only time it was employed.
That argument proceeded as follows: The Cincinnati initiative makes it
impossible to enact anti-discrimination legislation for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
through normal lobbying of city council and normal majority vote. One must amend
the city charter to restore such protection.2 Under the Ohio Constitution,23 there are
only two ways to amend a municipal charter: (1) obtain a two-thirds vote by city
council; or (2) present city council with a petition signed by ten percent of the
'7517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The amendment prohibits special treatment of
homosexuals, and nothing more."). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Romer majority, flatly
rejected this assertion. Id. at 631.
" 128 F.3d at 297.
19517 U.S. at 63 1.
2
°U.S. CoNST. amend. 1(1791).
2
'Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
444-47 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), on remand, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to the Cincinnati initiative, distinguishing Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
22860 F. Supp. at 445.
23OHo CONST., art. XVIII, § 9.
2000]
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electorate. Thus, to restore the anti-discrimination protections they have lost, gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals are confronted by special burdens faced by no other political
minority. They must leap through one of two hoops of flame: Go and get a super
majority in city council, or hit the streets and gather signatures from ten percent of
the electorate. Compounding these burdens are two additional problems. First, the
Cincinnati initiative appears by its terms to prohibit the first option (seeking a super
majority in city council).24 Second, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who take to the
street to collect the requisite signatures are all the while stripped of anti-
discrimination protection in housing and employment-exposing them to retaliation
and thus chilling their speech.25
By singling out one political minority, abolishing its anti-discrimination
protection, and then saddling it with heightened electoral burdens should it ever seek
to restore those protections, the Cincinnati initiative left gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
at a special disadvantage in lobbying their government for desired legislation. This,
held the district court, was a violation of the Petition Clause.26
What, finally, do we know about the Petition Clause? Though it has generated
scant attention from lawyers and judges, the right to petition has an ancient
lineage-traceable all the way back to Magna Carta (1215)27 -and was firmly
rooted in the American colonies by the time of the Revolution.28 Indeed, 50 years
before the First Amendment's adoption, the colonial assemblies were already
treating the right to petition as deserving of the greatest protection.29 The few
scholars who have looked at this history assert that the right to petition originated
and developed separately from the other expressive freedoms (speech, press, and
assembly);3" that it was treated as superior to those other freedoms;" and that it was
subject to much fewer restrictions than those other freedoms.32  In 1680-when
constructive treason,33 licensing,34 and seditious libel 5 effected ferocious restrictions
on speech and press-the English Parliament adopted resolutions singling out the
24Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 447.
251d. at 446, 447.
'61d. at 444-47.
27julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of
Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22 (1993); Norman B.
Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly
Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1986).
2 8Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 28; Smith, supra note 27, at 1170-75.
29Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 20.
30Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1168-69.
31Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1167-69.
32Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1153-54.
33 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 9 (1985); FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 265-68 (1952).
34LEVY, supra note 33, at 6, 12; SIEBERT, supra note 33, at 260-63.
35LEVY, supra note 33, at 11; SIEBERT, supra note 33, at 271.
[Vol. 48:131
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right to petition as an ancient privilege and expelling certain members for attempting
to thwart its exercise by the citizenry. a6 Thus, the Petition Clause embodies a right
whose lineage appears longer and stronger than that of the great freedoms of speech
and press.
Seemingly unaware of this lineage, the Supreme Court has described the Petition
Clause as "cut from the same cloth" as the other First Amendment freedoms.3"
Though this may be historically inaccurate, it nevertheless bodes well for Petition
Clause claimants, who can expect a heightened scrutiny comparable to that reserved
for other First Amendment claims. Indeed, the Court has expressly held that
"'statutes ... limit[ing] the power of the people to initiate legislation are to be
closely scrutinized and narrowly construed."' 38
Let me conclude my remarks simply by recalling my original purpose in making
them. My objective here was merely to plant a seed: to identify an alternative basis
for vindicating the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals-especially when
combatting homophobic voter initiatives like those in Romer and Cincinnati. It's my
hope that-confronted by the new wave of voter initiatives that will likely follow in
Cincinnati's wake-the Petition Clause will serve as a useful tool in fighting efforts
to cripple the ability of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to enact or restore anti-
discrimination protection.
36Smith, supra note 27, at 1160 (citing 4 Part. Hist. Eng. 1174 (1700)). These resolutions
stated that "it is and ever hath been the undoubted right of the subjects of England to petition
the King for the calling and sitting of Parliament and the redressing of grievances," and,
further, that "to traduce such petitioning as a violation of duty, and to represent it to his
majesty as tumultuous and seditious is to betray the liberty of the subject, and contribute to the
design of subverting the ancient legal constitution of this kingdom, and introducing arbitrary
power." Id.
37McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,482 (1985).
38Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760,
763 (Colo. 1983)).
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 48 Clev. St. L. Rev.  135 2000
HeinOnline  -- 48 Clev. St. L. Rev.  136 2000
